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ABSTRACT
In this paper we analyze the cryptanalysis of the simplified data encryption standard algorithm using  
meta-heuristics and in particular genetic algorithms. The classic fitness function when using such an  
algorithm is to compare n-gram statistics of a the decrypted message with those of the target message.  
We show that using such a function is irrelevant in case of Genetic Algorithm, simply because there is no  
correlation between the distance to the real key (the optimum) and the value of  the fitness,  in other  
words, there is no hidden gradient. In order to emphasize this assumption we experimentally show that a  
genetic  algorithm perform worse  than  a  random search  on  the  cryptanalysis  of  the  simplified  data  
encryption standard algorithm.
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1.INTRODUCTION
Meta-heuristics are powerful tools for solving optimization problems. They have been applied  
to many combinatorial problems, and they are able to tackle problems for which the search 
space  is  too  large  for  an  exhaustive  search.  Cryptanalysis  is  the  process  of  recovering  a  
plain-text from a cipher. In order to deter attacks, the process relies on a large search space. For  
this reason, many meta-heuristics, and in particular Genetic Algorithm (GA) [1] [2], Memetic 
algorithm  (MA),  Simulated  Annealing  (SA)  or  Tabu  search  (TS)  have  been  tried  for 
cryptanalysis.
The Simplified Data Encryption Standard (SDES) is a simplified version of the well known 
Data  Encryption  Standard  (DES)  algorithm.  The  SDES  has  been  designed  for  academic 
purposes and is used as a benchmark for cryptanalysis [3]. 
It  is  well  known that  cryptanalysis  of  the  SDES  scheme  is  an  NP-hard  problem and  that 
meta-heuristics are well designed to solve combinatorial and difficult problems. By exploring a 
large set of solutions that improve over time, evolutionary algorithms have been successful for 
solving difficult and challenging problems. Even if the SDES is an academic and fairly easy 
problem that can be solved with an exhaustive search (as the key length is only 10 bits, there are  
no more than 2^10 = 1024 keys to try) it is used as a starting example for meta-heuristics and 
evolutionary cryptanalysis. 
Currently,  researchers  in  the  cryptanalysis  field  look  for  regularities  in  the  plain-text  (if  
available),  in the encrypted text,  try to exploit  vulnerabilities in the encryption process and  
stochastic search-based methods were not regarded as possible alternatives for cryptanalysis.
However as the brute force algorithms are inadequate for cryptanalysis for standard encryption 
schemes  (DES requires  a  56-bit  length  key  for  instance),  meta-heuristics  and  evolutionary 
methods have drown a fair amount of attention from the cryptanalysis field.
As early as 1993, Spillman  [4] was the first to introduce an evolutionary approach based on 
genetic algorithm for cryptanalysis to discover a simple substitution cipher. Mathhews [5] used 
genetic algorithms for transposition ciphers. In this work, GAs were used to seek the accurate 
permutation. In the same way, Jacobsen [6] proposed a hill-climbing approach to attack simple 
and polyalphabetical substitution ciphers.
More  recently,  several  interesting  studies  were  carried  out  for  cryptanalysis  of  SDES  via 
meta-heuristics and evolutionary approaches. Rao et al  [7] were the first  ones to study how 
several  optimization  heuristics  (tabu  search  algorithms,  simulated  annealing  and  genetic 
algorithm) could match 9 to 10 bits of the target in about 15 to 20 minutes. No algorithms  
performed better than the others. This work was enhanced by Garg in several papers [8] [9] [10] 
[11] where she studied how to use memetic and genetic algorithms to break the SDES key. 
Other works regarding cryptography using evolutionary tools can be found in [12][13][14].
All  the  work  described  in  the  previous  section  provides  a  test-bed  for  evaluating  the  
performance  of  memetic  and  evolutionary  approaches  and  furthermore  showed  that  unlike 
classic methods for breaking encryption schemes that require mathematical knowledge, these  
new approaches  were  attractive  as  they  need  little  cryptological  knowledge.  However,  we 
strongly believe that these approaches are biased and that on average they perform no better  
than random search and that the use of evolutionary schemes to break state-of-the-art encryption 
process require a better insight understanding of the encryption process.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the SDES algorithm. Section 3 presents 
the random search while section 4 briefly describes the genetic algorithms. Experiments and 
discussions about the possible flaws of previous papers are explained in Section 5. Section 6 
draws some conclusions and presents some hints to efficiently use memetic and evolutionary 
algorithms in cryptanalysis.
2.THE SIMPLIFIED DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD
The SDES  algorithm  [3] is  a  simple  encryption  algorithm,  it  was  devised  for  pedagogical 
purposes. It is a symmetric-key algorithm which means that the sender and the recipient share  
the same key.
 It uses a 10-bit key and takes an 8-bit block of plain-text to produce an 8-bit block of cipher  
text. The decryption process works similarly, except the cipher is the input and the produced 
plain-text is the output. 
The algorithm consists in five steps: an initial permutation (IP), a complex function fk, another 
permutation  function  (SW),  another  application  of  the  fk function  and  eventually  a  final 
permutation  (IP-1).  This  final  permutation  is  the  inverse  of  the  initial  permutation.  These 
different steps are now detailed.
2.1 Key Generation
SDES is based on the use of a 10-bit  key. From this key, two 8 bit  sub-keys are produced  
respectively called K1 and K2.  These two sub-keys are produced through different and easy 
binary operations: circular left shift and permutations.
2.2 Initial And Final Permutations
As previously said, the algorithm takes as input an 8-bit block. The first operation is an initial  
permutation called IP. The initial permutation is (1,5,2,0,3,7,4,6) which means that the 5th bit 
will be the 2nd bit after this initial permutation. 
For instance, if we define the 8-bit block as (m0, m1, m2, m3, m4, m5, m6, m7). Then, IP(m0, m1, 
m2, m3, m4, m5, m6, m7) = (m1,m5,m2,m0,m3,m7,m4,m6).
2.3 The Fk Function
The fk function  can  be  seen  as  the  heart  of  the  simplified  data  encryption  standard  SDES 
scheme, it is a complex function that involves a combination of permutation and non linear 
functions called Sboxes.
The fk function can be summed up as:
f k (L , R)=(L⊕F (R , SK ) , R)
Where F is a mapping from a 4-bit strings to a 4-bit strings, L is the leftmost 4 bits, R the  
rightmost 4 bits  and SK the subkey. The mapping F is the trickiest part of the scheme as it 
involves non linear functions.
The first step is known as an expansion/permutation operation. It basically consists in mapping 
from a 4-bit string to an 8-bit strings. 
For  instance  if  the  4-bit  input  is  (m0,  m1,  m2,  m3,  m4),  the  expansion/permutation 
operation consists in: (m4, m1, m2, m3, m2, m3, m4, m1).
An  exclusive  or  (xor)  is  performed  on  the  output  of  the  expansion/permutation 
operation with the first sub-key K1:
 (m4⊕ k1,1, m1⊕k1,2 , m2⊕k1,3 , m3⊕k1,4 , m2⊕k1,5 , m3⊕k1,6 , m4⊕k1,7 , m1⊕k1,8 ) where k1,i 
indicates the ith bit of the sub-key.
This output is usually depicted for clarity reasons in a matrix form:
M=∣m4⊕k1,1m2⊕k1,5 m1⊕k1,2m3⊕k1,6 m2⊕k1,3m4⊕k1,7 m3⊕k1,4m1⊕k1,8∣
At this step, the first row of this matrix M is used as input to the S0 box to produce a 2-bit output 
while the second row is used to produce another 2-bit output from the S1 box.
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The process is quite easy. The 1st and 4th bits are turned into an integer to specify the row of  
the S0 while the 2nd and 3rd bits are used to specify the column. For instance, if the first row of 
M is (1,0,1,0), the output of the S0 box will be 2 (row 2 (10), column 1 (01)). This value is 
eventually turned into a binary number and delivers 2 bits. Additionally, the last row of M is  
used in the same way that S0 as an input for S1 to produce two more bits that are merged (the 
two bits of S0 on the left, two bits of S1 on the right).
These 4 bits undergo a last permutation called P4 (m2, m4, m3, m1) to provide the output the F 
function.
A final xor operation is performed on the output of the F function with the 4 leftmost bits of the  
input, the 4 rightmost bits being untouched.
As it can be seen, the output of the fk function only alters the leftmost 4 bits of the input. The 
purpose of the Switch function is to invert the input to iterate the fk function with the rightmost 
4 bits.
2.4 The Switch Function
The switch function is a relatively simple function. It simply permutes the first four bits with the 
last four bits: SW(m0, m1, m2, m3, m4, m5, m6, m7) = (m4,m5,m6,m7,m0,m1,m2,m3).
After  this  step,  another  iteration  of  the  fk function  is  performed allowing to  encrypt  the  4 
rightmost bits. However during this step, a slight modification is realized. Instead of xoring the  
output  of  the  expansion/permutation operation with the sub-key K1,  the sub-key K2 is  used 
instead.
A summary of the SDES algorithm is presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1. The SDES algorithm1.
3.RANDOM SEARCH
Random Search (RS) belongs to the family of numerical optimization. It does not require the  
gradient of the function to be optimized and hence, can be performed on functions which are not 
continuous or differentiable. Such optimization can be applied to black-box optimization. The 
principle of this method is relatively simple : at each iteration a random solution from the search 
space is generated. If this solution is better than the current best solution, this solution replaces  
the current best solution. At the end, the best solution found by the algorithm is returned.
Needless  to  say,  this  method is  a  basic  method which is  studied here  only to  enhance the 
problematic of this paper. This method can be seen as a lower bound of the quality of a search 
algorithm.
4.GENETIC ALGORITHMS
Evolutionary  algorithms  belong  to  the  family  of  stochastic  optimization  algorithms.  These 
methods are bio-inspired techniques that crudely mimic reproduction, mutations, crossovers and 
selection.  They  are  modeled  according  to  Darwin's  evolution  theory.  In  these  algorithms,  
individuals represent candidate solutions of the optimization problem. These algorithms do not 
require the gradient of the problem to be optimized. Genetic Algorithms (GA) [1] [2] belong to 
the  family  of  evolutionary  algorithms.  They are  mainly  used  with  a  discrete  search  space, 
1 Figure from http://homepage.smc.edu/morgan_david/vpn/des.htm
meaning that they are used for combinatorial optimization problems. A population of candidate 
solutions evolves,  and generations after  generations,  individuals are biased towards the best 
ones (according to the fitness function). Crossovers and mutations are random operators used 
for exploring the search space. Algorithm 1 illustrates this method. 
This algorithm is used in Section 5 as it is praised in [9] as a good scheme to hack the key of 
SDES.
Algorithm 1. A generic Genetic Algorithm.
5.EXPERIMENTS
5.1 Checking The Encryption Process Performance 
Using bio-inspired algorithms for the cryptanalysis of the simplified DES is based on a very 
strong assumption: a fitness function can guide the search towards the perfect encryption key.
The technique that is currently used for any language (in this paper, English is used without loss 
of generality) is to compare n-gram statistics of the decrypted message with those of the target 
message. 
To evaluate the suitability of a proposed key K, the encrypted text is decrypted using this test  
key  K,  and  the  statistics  of  the  decrypted  text  are  compared  to  the  statistics  of  the  target  
language. Usually, only unigrams and bigrams are used since trigrams require more computing 
1. Generate the initial parent Population
2. Evaluate all individuals of the parent Population
3. While a stopping condition is not reached do
4. for all individuals i in population do
5. parent1 = parentalSelection(parentPopulation)
6. if crossover probability is satisfied then
7. parent2 = parentalSelection(parentPopulation)
8. offspringPopulation[i] = crossover(parent1, parent2)
9. else
10. offspringPopulation[i] = parent1
11. endif
12. if mutation probability is satisfied then
13. offspringPopulation[i] = mutate(offspringPopulation[i])
14. endif
15. endfor
16. Evaluate all individual of the offspringPopulation
17. parentPopulation=
survivalSelection(offspringPopulation, parentPopulation)
18. endwhile
power and time. This additional  cost  is too important  in comparison with its corresponding 
information.
This fitness function is defined as follows:
F k=α∑
i
∣Ei−Di∣+β∑
i
∣E(i , j)−D(i, j )∣ (1)   with  α and  β being  the  weights  given  to 
unigram and digram,
where Ei is the percentage of the ith letter in the English language and E(i,j) is the frequency of  
a letter i followed by a letter j in English (for instance the frequency of “th” is 1.52 while the  
frequency of “ld” is 0.02). Di is the frequency of a letter i in the decrypted text and D(i,j) is the  
frequency of the digram ij in the decrypted message.
This fitness function is 0 if the correct key K is used in the decryption process and the greater  
the value of Fk, the worst the solution.
It is quite obvious that this fitness function can be used in a minimization process and when this  
function tends towards 0 we can assume that the text is close to the plain-text. It is a good 
practice to evaluate this fitness functions over several texts and the longer the text is, the more 
accurate the statistics of unigram and digram are. In the case of genetic or memetic algorithms, 
this fitness function is used to evaluate candidate key and to guide the evolutionary process  
towards the good solutions (keys). 
Figure 2. Relevance of the fitness function
For methods like genetic algorithms, memetic algorithms or hill-climbing strategies, a strong 
assumption is made: there exists an implicit gradient to better solutions to the best solution. In 
other words this means that the more bits a solution shares with the real key ( i.e. the target key), 
the greater the fitness value, thus guiding the research to share more bits with the real key. In [9]
[13], Garg shows that using memetic algorithm, several bits of the key are correctly recovered 
after several minutes for cipher text ranging from 100 to 1000 characters. However, we think 
that there is some serious flaw in the reasoning: the fact that this fitness function is fruitful to  
the search landscape.
In order to show that using the fitness function Fk to guide the evolutionary process is more or 
less like trying to find a needle in a haystack, we devise the following experiment: starting with 
a given key of 10 bits, we perturb one of the 10 bits of this original key to get a new key and we  
evaluate Fk over this new key. This experiment is iterated 9 times, one for each possible key  
with a distance 1 from the original key, then we go on with all the possible keys with a distance 
of 2 from the original key and so on until we evaluate the fitness function for all possible keys 
with a distance of 9 (note that for all cases, the number of possible keys with a distance n is  
equal to the number of keys with a distance 10-n).
Figures 2 and 3 represent the fitness values of the perturbation of 8 random keys (4 per figure).  
Due to the lack of space, only 8 different keys are displayed but are fully representative of the 
Figure 3. Relevance of the fitness function using only unigrams
1024 different  keys. From these figures the first  point to note is that  there is absolutely no 
correlation between any two perturbed keys whatever  its  distance from the original  key is!  
Furthermore,  it  seems that  solutions at  one bit  distance from the target key are attributed a 
misleading fitness value [15]
When  comparing  these  figures  with  results  from  [9][10][13],  we  can  understand  why  the 
memetic  approach seems to remain stuck to  no more than 9 bits  matched (out  of  10),  the 
solutions at a distance of one bit of the local optimum act as a deterrent and hopping from these 
solutions to converge to the global optimum is rather intractable.
5.2 Comparison Between A Random Search And A Genetic Algorithm.
In the previous section, the fitness landscape of the SDES is examined and we show that is is  
quite deceptive. In this section, we study the number of bits matching with the target key for  
two methods:  a  GA-based  approach  and the  classic  random search  scheme.  To assess  our  
approach and to show that using a GA with the fitness function presented is Section 5.1 and 
used  in  [11] for  cryptanalysis  is  not  an  efficient  tool  for  cryptanalysis,  we  carry  out  the 
following experiments.
As in [9], a simple GA is programmed whose fitness function is equation 1  and is compared to 
a random search method. The purpose of these experiments is to show whether or not a GA 
performs better or not than a random search for the cryptanalysis of SDES.
The GA is tuned as in [9], the population size was set to 10, the probability for crossover is set  
to 0,95 while the probability for mutation is 0.05. 10 generations are performed, so that the total  
number of evaluations is the same than the experiment using random search. Table 2 sums up  
the results for the GA approach for texts of various lengths (from 100 to +100k characters)  
while table 1 shows the results for the RS scheme.  There is no specific parameters for the RS 
scheme: a solution is simply randomly generated. For each text size, 100 runs of the GA and RS 
are performed, the standard deviation and the average fitness of the number of matched bits are 
computed. The best of the 100 runs is recorded.
According to these results it is quite obvious that the GA does not outperform the RS. Moreover 
is seems that the GA heuristic seems to add some kind of deleterious mechanism to the search.
From all these results it seems clear that we can conclude that using a GA with this fitness 
function is irrelevant and that a basic random search, usually considered as a lower bound, is 
more efficient.
We can also say that this kind of problems is not suited to meta-heuristics like GA as the SDES 
like all cryptographic schemes is essentially devised as a misleading problem with no gradient. 
If some kind of gradient was available to the problem, SDES, like DES, would be much more 
easily hackable.
Table 1. Results of the random search.
Text size Fitness Mean Standard deviation Best fitness found
100 5,4 2,27 10
200 6,4 1,57 10
400 6,9 1,52 10
800 6,7 1,49 10
1600 7,4 2,01 10
3200 6,3 1,34 8
6400 6,9 1,97 10
12800 6,7 2 10
25600 5,8 2,74 10
51200 6,4 2,72 10
102400 5,2 1,48 7
Table 2. Results of the Genetic Algorithm.
Text size Fitness Mean Standard deviation Best fitness found
100 5,4 2,27 10
200 5,6 1,51 8
400 5,7 1,57 7
800 5,8 2,1 10
1600 4,9 1,66 8
3200 6,1 1,91 10
6400 6,4 1,90 9
12800 5,4 1,90 8
25600 6,3 2,16 10
51200 5,8 1,40 8
102400 5 1,89 8
To conclude, using an evolutionary approach for the cryptanalysis of SDES is not an adequate 
response. Moreover, it seems that it in some cases it performs worse than the random search.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In  this  paper  we  emphasize  the  importance  of  having  a  relevant  fitness  function  when 
meta-heuristic methods, and in particular when genetic algorithms are used to the cryptanalysis 
of the SDES . We first study the landscape of the fitness function in order to show that there is 
no  correlation  between the  fitness  function  and the  distance  to  the  correct  key.  This  is  an 
important fact because this means that having a good score (according to the fitness) does not 
mean  that  we  are  close  to  the  optimum.  Then  we  compare  the  efficiency  of  the  genetic 
algorithm with a random search. From these experiments,  we can conclude that  the genetic 
algorithm does not converge correctly to the optimum. The SDES algorithm uses a 10-bit key,  
meaning the search space equals to 1024. This allows us to perform a random search. In fact the 
results is quite interesting: in average the random search is better than the genetic algorithm. 
The number of correct bits for all text sizes is 6.37 for the random search against 5.67 for the 
genetic algorithm. Moreover 8 times (over 10) the optimum (i.e. the correct key) is found with 
the random search against  4 times over 10 for the genetic algorithm. The main explication 
comes from the bad fitness function used. Figures 2 and 3 show in particular that being at a  
distance of 1 to the correct key corresponds generally to a fitness trap. There is no doubt that the  
genetic algorithm converges to a local optimum. 
We  strongly  believe  that  using  evolutionary  computing  techniques  might  be  of  help  for 
cryptanalysis but it should be used not as a silver bullet to magically retrieve the key but more 
as the tool for cryptanalysis. The most complex part of SDES consists of a combination of the  
non-linear functions (called Sbox); these Sboxes might be built using evolutionary computation 
approaches and may also be hacked with this approach.
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